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Introduction
In this paper we argue that the current state of economic theory as well as the performance of capitalist economies in recent years support the view that the path through time of a capitalist economy is best described as the result of the interaction between the system's endogenous dynamics, which if unconstrained would lead to complex paths that include periods of apparent growth, business cycles and economic instability, and the impact of institutions and interventions which, if apt, constrain the outcomes of capitalist market processes to viable or acceptable outcomes. We call these institutions and interventions "thwarting systemsVV.
We deviate from the conventions of orthodox economic theory by assuming that in capitalist economies the core decision makers are profit seeking businessmen and bankers.I Even though their key actions are forward looking, these agents are constrained by legacies of the past in the form of capital assets and financial commitments. Furthermore they do this within an institutional structure which they know is changing even as they act. Every day the actions of business men and bankers determine "tomorrow'sI capital
1. The conventional view is that "Any economic model is going to have as its center a collection of hypothetical consumers whose decisions, together with the technology and market structure, determine the operating characteristics of the system . ..I' (Lucas, 1987 p.20) asset and financial structure. In capitalist economies yesterday and tomorrow are present today.
The agents' expectations of how the economy will perform is one way tomorrow is present today. Each day contracts are entered upon on the basis of tenuously held beliefs and imprecise information: our bankers and businessmen act and decide under conditions of uncertainty in the sense of 3. It is a problem in the intellectual history of economics to explain how Keynes's treatment of expectations formation under conditions of uncertainty, which is central to an understanding of the General Theory, disappeared from the orthodox Keynesianism of the postwar period.
(General Theory, Ch. XII and XVII, and H.P. Minsky, l975) 4. In the rational expectations school's view the model of the economy that guides agents behavior is invariant with respect to unfolding economic experience.
investigating will be complex time dependent systems. The mathematics of such systems leads to the proposition that capitalist economies should from time to time exhibit economic instability.5
But instability rarely becomes explosive. We need to understand why.
We use the ceiling-and-floor version of the accelerator- Section 5 states and interprets two theorems -an anti laissez faire theorem and a limitation upon performance theorem -that are implicit in the argument. The last section is the conclusion.
Two Views on Dynamics
There have long been l'two viewstt of business cycle dynamics: one is that the endogenous process of the economy generates an equilibrium which may be static but now is usually taken to be a "growth equilibrium@', and the other is that endogenous processes lead to business cycles and instability.8
7. This view harks back to H. P. Minsky's 1957 article.
8. In his memorial of Wesley Mitchell, Schumpeter distinguishes between those economists who hold that II... the economic process is essentially non oscillatory and that the explanation of cyclical as well as other fluctuations must be sought in particular circumstances (monetary or other) which disturb that even flow." with the "...'theory that the economic process itself is essentially wave like -The first view leaves business cycles to be explained.
In the work of Slutsky (1937) and Frisch (1933) -as well as Friedman (1968) and Lucas(1972 ) -the economy is a mechanism that transforms exogenous shocks, which are either random or unanticipated policy interventions, into business cycles. A llKeynesianl' endogenous explanation of business cycles received a mathematical statement in the formalization of that cycles are the form of capitalist evolution-. ..I@ (J. A. Schumpeter (1951 ) page 252) Schumpeter held that Mitchell, Keynes and he h>mself held the view that "..cycles are inherent in the capitalist process." 9. Lucas concludes his 1976 paper by noting that II This paper has been an attempt to resolve the paradox posed by Gurley (1961) in his mild but accurate parody of Friedmanian monetary theory: money is a veil, but when the veil flutters, real output sputters." (Reprinted in Lucas (1981) page 84.) the interaction of the accelerator and multiplier as a second-order linear difference eguation. (Samuelson 1939 Minsky (1957 Minsky ( ,1959 Interest in these models of endogenous cycles waned after the 1950's: strong business cycles did not appear and the rather steady growth made it plausible to assume that
10.
For an interpretation of new initial conditions as changes in regime, see Ferri and Greenberg (1989) . i.e. that the Frisch-Slutsky approach was valid. 11 In the work of Lucas (1972 Lucas ( , 1981 Lucas ( , and 1987 2) is the foundation upon which exogenous shock models of business cycles rest. The Smithian conjecture has been transformed into the theorem that "A competitive is a Pareto optimum.U8 The "invisible hand"
leads to laissez-faire as a policy position.l*
The formal demonstration that a competitive equilibrium proposition equilibrium is a Pareto optimum theorem was achieved in the 1950's by Arrow and Debreu (1954) and McKenzie (1959) . This achievement fulfilled only one part-the proof of the 13 It is worth stressing that modern analysis of nonlinear models allows for the presence of instability which does not necessarily degenerate into runaway situations. However, in such models small changes in parameters can be responsible for large changes in the dynamics. Thus, various innovations that might change parameters might have the effect of setting up entirely new dynamics such that people lose the ability to interpret the future and this affects their behavior. In this context, thwarting mechanisms try to control the outcomes and keep them more stable.
14. The assumption underlying this view is that laissezfaire does not unleash predators motivated by greed who acquire and exploit market power, but that market conditions force powerless agents to serve a "social good".
existence of a competitive equilibrium-of the research program of general equilibrium theory. The full research program included the demonstration of the uniqueness and stability of competitive equilibrium. It is now known that the second and third part cannot be achieved: the competitive equilibrium is not unique and it is not stable.
Even at the most abstract levels it is not possible to claim that if left to its own device, a competitive economy would achieve and sustain an equilibrium. I5
The 15 The argument that claim of the power of the 'Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations' made by many economists goes beyond the proven properties of the Walrasian system is to be found in Ingrao-Israel (1987) , Arrow-Hahn (1971) and Duffie-Sonnenschein (1989 Brusco (1982) . Intense competition, in periods of excess supply, must not be allowed to push price to marginal cost. Bankers who take seriously their responsibilities to the holders of instruments they put out or sell will not finance industries that require expensive capital assets unless there is some believable guarantee that price will not fall to marginal cost.
Such a guarantee can take two forms: one is to guarantee that aggregate demand will be adequate, and the second is and less than perfect adjustment by interventions the system can never be in an optimal allocation alignment. The theorem that this implies is "The "practical best" for an economy falls short of the abstract best."
There is a corollary to the limitation upon performance theorem. Each agent maximizes within the system of interventions and institutions that constrain the performance of the economy to tolerable outcomes. To agents for whom the constraints are binding, the attainable maxima are deemed to be inferior to the unconstrained maximum. institutions, and interventions, they will modify their behavior, and this will in turn change the systemic effect of the interventions. A system of intervention put in place in one environment can be effective for a while, but as agents acquire knowledge of how this system affects their outcomes they will adapt their behavior, and this will change the effectiveness of the interventions. The system of intervention cannot be put in place once and for all. Policy makers must be aware that there are always incentives to evade and avoid the interventions, and they must adjust their interventions accordingly.
These two theorems imply that any success in sustaining stable growth depends upon the institutional structure.
Furthermore, because the institutional structure and the sources of instability change, due in part to the effects of units seeking only their own gain, the success of any policy structure will be transitory. Minsky (1986) makes the same points without reference to the mathematical properties of nonlinear systems and within a specific model of profit generation in which profits are determined by the structure of demand.
public in the 1930's were skeptical of the claims that were advanced for laissez-faire. Trial and error led to the structure of interventions and institutions that survived.21
The statement that complex systems will from time to time generate unstable movements through time is a mathematical proposition. But mathematics is not economics.
Economists need to identify the economics that lead to unstable dynamics. One aspect of the economy that may do this is the way successful performance transforms market power from a factor that facilitates investment to a factor that supports inflation.
The expectations stability and regular growth of profits changes role of market power.
induced by the economic
The economics of the neo-classical synthesis accepted that market economies were flawed in that there are no adequate market processes to guarantee the achievement and maintenance of a close approximation to full employment. 22
The political economy problem in the world after Thatcher and Reagan is to recognize once again that the market way of doing things is flawed not only in its ability to maintain adequate aggregate demand but also as a device for assuring 21. The above is a myopic United States based view. In Sweden, which had a particularity sophisticated cadre of economists in the 1930's and a knowledgeable political leadership in their Social Democratic Party, may have knowingly introduced the welfare state.
22 For a discussion of these models, see Ferri and Minsky (1989) .
